This article examines how chief executive officers (CEOs) influence their boards in symphony orchestra governance. Traditional governance research has studied the impact of structural factors on the CEO-board relationship, but less attention has been paid to the ways in which influence in these relationships is enacted, and to the role of the CEO in particular. Drawing on two intensive, longitudinal case studies, this article investigates the behavioural dynamics of the CEO-board relationship, identifying four key processes that underpin successful CEO influence: exploiting key relationships, managing impressions, managing information, and protecting formal authority. It concludes with an examination of the interrelated and embedded nature of these processes, and considers the implications for theory and research in organizational governance.
This meeting, observed during the fieldwork for the study described in this article, highlights an important element of organizational governance: how CEOs influence (and fail to influence) their boards in organizational decisionmaking. CEO-board influence is such a critical issue in organizational governance in part because of the key position directors have in the organizational hierarchy, responsible for approving all strategic decisions and ultimately accountable for their outcomes. While CEOs are expected to provide strategic focus and develop initiatives to fulfil the organization's goals, their most significant proposals must be accepted by the board before they can be implemented. CEOs therefore need to influence their directors to accept their ideas and plans. CEO-board influence is also key on the occasions when CEOs need to get information, advice, or financial resources from directors in order to make decisions or take action. The success or failure with which CEOs influence boards thus fundamentally affects organizational decision-making at the highest level.
Although the relationship between CEOs and their boards forms the central focus of the governance literature (for example, Alexander et al. 1993; Daily and Dalton 1994; Johnson et al. 1996; Pearce and Zahra 1991; Zajac and Westphal 1996) , the processes through which CEOs influence their boards are relatively under-examined. Traditionally, research in this field has emphasized the impact of board structure and composition on CEO-board relations, in particular, examining the effects of CEO duality (whether the CEO and chairman roles are separate) and the ratio of insider to outsider directors on the board (for example, Kosnik 1987; Mallette and Fowler 1992; Misruchi 1983; Wade et al. 1990 ). More recently, a stream of behavioural research has emerged that focuses upon what boards do, supplementing our knowledge of what they look like (for example, Forbes and Milliken 1999; McNulty and Pettigrew 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty 1998; Stiles 2001; Zajac and Westphal 1998) . This work highlights important board activities that can be underplayed in more structural approaches, such as planning, shaping, and monitoring strategy to influence organizational decision-making. Little research exists, however, that examines the other side of the relationship -what CEOs do to influence their boards.
The present article addresses CEO-board influence in British sym-phony orchestras. There are several reasons why such organizations make valuable research sites for this topic. As medium-sized organizations employing around 130 people, orchestras are contexts where both the CEO and board directors have potentially very significant and direct roles in governance. A second feature of orchestras that make them an important site for governance research is the clear set of principal-agent dynamics at play within them. Although British orchestras do not have shareholders as such, care is taken to appoint external directors who represent key stakeholder groups in the community. Because of this, their roles are quite unambiguous: they are representatives of particular community stakeholder groups (not simply well-intentioned volunteers doing what they think is generally best for the organization) and are held legally accountable for their actions. Third, although British symphony orchestras are run on a non-profit basis, their commercial environments create many of the same tensions between their CEOs and boards as exist in the private sector. Orchestras operate in contexts as fiercely competitive as many private-sector markets, and are subject to many of the demands that face private companies: they have products (concerts and recordings) that must be competitively marketed and sold, and a wide range of customers to satisfy. Thus, financial viability is a central issue for symphony orchestras and is a fundamental responsibility of their boards of directors. Lastly, the governance models within symphony orchestras represent something of a hybrid, with features of both private corporations and institutional non-profit organizations, such as museums and hospitals. Consequently, examining CEO influence in this context may shed light on the governance dynamics that operate within both of these domains.
This article contributes to our understanding of organizational governance in two main ways. First, this study enables an appreciation of CEO-board influence by identifying a critical set of processes through which CEOs influence their boards. Processes such as these are increasingly acknowledged as important in organizational governance research (Lorsch and MacIver 1989; Roberts and Stiles 1999; Westphal 1998 Westphal , 1999 ), but we still know relatively little about how they operate. The present study adds to existing structural explanations of CEO-board influence both by identifying specific behavioural processes and by examining how they work together and over time. The second contribution this article makes is to existing process research that has focused on the role of the board in organizational governance Pettigrew 1996, 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty 1995, 1998; Stiles 2001) . We now know a significant amount about the ways in which and conditions under which directors are likely to influence key organizational decisions. The present study adds to this work by offering a detailed examination of the CEO's role in the CEO-board relationship in organizational governance.
Current Research on CEO-Board Influence
Research from a variety of perspectives, examining diverse organizational forms, has highlighted the importance of CEO influence on boards. Specifically, this topic has been studied using structural, behavioural, and processual approaches, each revealing different aspects of the CEO-board relationship in governance. Despite this attention, however, there is still little research that offers a systematic description and explanation of the processes through which CEOs influence their boards.
Structural Perspectives
Much of the empirical work in the structural tradition derives from two opposing theoretical positions, one identifying the board as an important control mechanism and the other casting it as a powerless tool of management.
Maitlis: Taking it from the Top
According to agency theory, the board is a mechanism that ensures top management acts in accord with shareholder interests by resisting the opportunism and self-interested behaviour of managers (Fama and Jensen 1983) . Managerial hegemony theorists, in contrast, cast the board as a legal fiction: a co-opted appendage institution that, despite its formal governing power over management, is in fact dominated by them (Kosnik 1987; Lorsch and MacIver 1989; Mace 1971; Pfeffer 1972) .
In studies that test these two theories, CEO influence is typically derived from measures of board structure and composition (for example, Conyon and Peck 1998; Daily and Dalton 1994; Pearce and Zahra 1991; Westphal 1999; Westphal and Zajac 1995) . CEOs are seen as exercising influence by determining and maintaining the composition of the board: it is thought that by influencing the selection and retention of directors sympathetic to their views, or those who feel in some way indebted to them, CEOs will more readily find board support for their proposals (for example, Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; Westphal and Zajac 1995; Zajac and Westphal 1996) . From this perspective, a relatively powerful CEO is one with a less independent board, that is, with a greater number of insider directors, in which the CEO and chairman positions are held by one person, where the tenure of the CEO is greater than that of the average board director, and in which board directors are demographically similar to the CEO.
Similar variables have been examined in studies of the non-profit sector, where research has investigated the 'governance pattern' of different organizations (for example, Murray et al. 1992; Saidel and Harlan 1998) . This research has highlighted a variety of structural factors that determine the balance of influence between the CEO and board, including demographic characteristics of board members, the size of the organization, and perceptions of environmental predictability (Murray et al. 1992) , as well as the strength of the organization's executive leadership and the perceived legitimacy, or reputation, of its board members (Harlan and Saidel 1994; Provan 1980; Saidel and Harlan 1998) . Together, these studies show the importance played by key structural factors in shaping CEO-board influence in both private and non-profit organizations. At the same time, however, they offer only a partial view of critical aspects of governance dynamics (Peck 1995) .
Behavioural Perspectives
Despite the wealth of studies examining board independence (for example, Conyon and Peck 1998; Westphal and Zajac 1994; Zahra and Pearce 1989; Zajac and Westphal 1996) , recent research has shown the value of investigations that go beyond the dimensions of board structure and composition. From a traditional structuralist perspective, we would expect that management decision-making would be better controlled by more independent boards (Fama and Jensen 1983) . In a study of CEO-influence behaviour, however, Westphal (1998) showed that boards can become less powerful when their independence is increased. Examining changes in boards over time, Westphal found that a reduction in structural independence prompted CEOs to increase their use of persuasion and ingratiation tactics with their directors. As a result, and counter to the predictions of agency theory, the power of these more independent boards diminished. This in turn affected a number of organizational outcomes. Westphal's (1998) study adds another level of sophistication to our understanding of CEO-board dynamics, highlighting the importance of certain CEO behaviours in determining the effect of a given board structure on an organization's governance.
Further evidence of the importance of behavioural aspects of the CEOboard relationship comes from research conducted in the non-profit sector. A series of studies of non-profit organizations highlights the central leadership role played by CEOs in governance, and reveals that organizational success or failure is often linked to a CEO's relationship with his or her board (Heimovics and Herman 1990; Heimovics 1990a, 1990b) . This research suggests that that the most effective CEOs carry out their roles through 'board-centred leadership', which includes behaviours such as 'facilitating interaction in board relationships', 'showing consideration and respect towards board members', and 'promoting board productivity' (Heimovics and Herman 1990; Heimovics et al. 1995; Heimovics 1989, 1990a) . These studies highlight the importance of understanding CEO-board influence as a critical element of executive leadership. However, they tend to examine it using retrospective accounts of CEO activities, often obtained from just one or two individuals at one point in time (for example, Herman and Heimovics 1990a; Westphal 1998) . They are therefore in danger of taking a somewhat narrow view of a CEO's influence behaviour, and one which is rooted in historical accounts of influence attempts that occurred at an earlier time.
Processual Perspectives
A growing number of writers have called for greater attention to be paid not only to micro-political behaviours in the study of governance, but also to the processes and contexts through which they occur (for example, GoldenBiddle and Rao 1997; Pettigrew 1996, 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty 1995, 1998; Peck 1995; Samra-Fredericks 2000a , 2000b Walsh and Seward 1990) . Several of these writers have argued that the distant, structural methods most commonly adopted in governance research need to be augmented by a processual approach that takes a more dynamic and fluid view of power and influence. The focus on action in context integral to these studies has allowed a rich understanding of the multiple factors affecting the CEO-board relationship (McNulty and Pettigrew 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty 1995; Stiles 2001) . This kind of process research explicitly acknowledges the importance of incorporating the social, political, and economic contexts in which the action has taken place, and allows the development of theory which highlights its dynamic and contextualized nature (Hinings 1997; Pettigrew 1997) .
Key studies in this tradition have focused on the degree of influence that boards have in strategy development (Lorsch and MacIver 1989; Mace 1971; Pettigrew 1996, 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty 1995, 1998; Stiles 2001) . Older work by Mace (1971) and Lorsch and MacIver (1989) suggests that CEOs are far more influential than their boards of directors, whom they cast as powerless bodies which simply ratify decisions made by powerful executives. This view has more recently been challenged, however: McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) argue that much of a board's influence occurs well before this final ratifying point in the decision-making process, with directors shaping both the ideas that form the content of company strategy and the processes through which these ideas evolve. Highlighting factors such as the process and conduct of board meetings, informal communication between directors, and the history and performance of the company, these authors illuminate the variety of processual and contextual determinants which influence the roles that board members take in key organizational decisions. The multifunctional nature of board activity is also highlighted in Stiles' (2001) in-depth study of board involvement in strategy: this research documents the directors' role in setting strategic parameters for the organization, which they do by determining and maintaining the business direction, gatekeeping, and confidence-building in executives.
The processual approach to governance is consistent with the shift seen over the past two decades in conceptions of power in organizations (Clegg 1989; Hardy and Clegg 1996) . While power has historically been understood as resulting from the possession and control of structural sources such as position, rewards, and information, more recent analyses have also emphasized power as relational and processual (Brass and Burkhardt 1993; Clegg 1989; Frost 1986; Knights and Wilmott 1992; Knights and McCabe 1999; Lawrence et al. 2001) . It is argued that while sources of power may be structurally embedded, merely possessing information or expertise does not in itself make a person powerful -rather, power is a phenomenon that is negotiated in relationships through the skills and strategies of interested actors. In contemporary conceptualizations, then, power and influence are seen not so much as what one has, but what one does with what one has (Foucault 1980; Knights and McCabe 1999) . This has important implications for the study of CEO influence on boards, since it suggests that if we want to understand the power dynamics in CEO-board relationships, we need to adopt methodologies and conceptualizations of power and influence that highlight the processes through which influence is achieved and that are sensitive to the contexts in which it occurs.
Taken together, these three bodies of governance research make a considerable contribution to our understanding of the CEO-board relationship. Studies in the structural tradition highlight the importance of board structure and composition in determining the relative sources of power available to directors and CEOs; these models are given still greater explanatory power through examinations of CEO behaviour which reveal the significance of certain key activities through which a CEO may effect influence over the board. Processual studies of boards offer insight not only into the critical role that boards can play in processes such as strategy development, but also the important temporal and contextual conditions under which directors are likely to have the greatest influence. What we still lack, however, is a systematic process analysis of the CEO-board relationship that concentrates upon the role of the CEO. The present inductive study takes as its focus the processes through which CEOs influence and fail to influence their boards in organizational decision-making.
Methods

Research Context
The data for this study were gathered in two British symphony orchestras, which were matched in terms of their size, core activities (concert giving, recording, and education and outreach work), and their artistic and financial performance relative to others of their kind, but which differed in their board composition. Examining two similar organizations operating with different governance structures offers a valuable opportunity for a contextual study of CEO-board influence processes. The Managed Symphony Orchestra (MSO), a 'regional contract' orchestra, was formally governed by an external board of directors, who had accountability for all of the organization's activities and was responsible for the appointment of the CEO. It had 22 members, including 11, predominantly business people, elected from the local community, and various others nominated by the city council and local authority. In addition, there were three employee directors -two musicians and one from the administration. Other than the player directors, only one board member was a professional musician. The Self-governing Symphony Orchestra (SSO) was one of the London 'independent', self-governing orchestras, run by a player-elected and dominated board, of which a player was always appointed chairman. This board was made up of seven player members and a small minority of external directors drawn from the business community. It was responsible for overseeing all the orchestra's activities, including the appointment of the CEO. There was a strong ideology of self-government in the organization: players proudly contrasted their organization with more traditionally structured ones, and the CEO frequently emphasized his status as 'an employee of the musicians'.
Data Collection Direct Observation of Board and Board Subcommittee Meetings
Over a period of more than two years, I attended 37 meetings of the two orchestras' boards and their associated subcommittees (see Table 1 ). All of these meetings lasted between 90 minutes and three hours, except for the MSO board away day, which was an all-day event. At every meeting, I sat with the other attendees, but remained silent throughout, taking detailed notes that were as near as possible to a literal transcript. Meetings were attended by between seven and twenty people; as the months passed, my attendance seemed to be barely noticed -indeed, newcomers or visitors sometimes assumed I was a member of the administrative staff taking minutes.
Supplementary Data Sources
Data from the board and board subcommittee meeting transcripts were supplemented by a number of other sources. These included interviews, documentary analysis, as well as extensive direct observation outside meetings: work shadowing the SSO's CEO for a day, observing office activity in the MSO on several occasions, observing the rehearsals of both orchestras, and going on an overseas tour with the SSO. I kept field notes on these observations throughout the study period, which provided an important additional source of data for the present study. I also collected a wide range of archival documentary materials, including internal strategic papers and other papers, several sector-level policy reports, and copies of minutes from meetings both that I had and had not been able to attend.
I conducted 79 formal, semi-structured interviews during the study period, including repeat interviews with key informants, in particular the CEO and board members of each orchestra (see Table 1 ). These interviews focused on decision-making in the organization, specifically tracing key decisions and the processes through which they were made over time. Questions addressed the individual's role in the organization, his or her perception of key issues facing the orchestra, as well as perceptions of the way in which recent decisions had been made. All but 10 of the interviews were recorded and transcribed; where it was not possible to record, I took detailed notes throughout.
Data Analysis
I conducted the analysis in two stages. The first of these involved developing a detailed description of the patterns of influence and influence behaviours exhibited by the two CEOs, drawing on data gathered in board and board subcommittee meetings, interview transcripts, relevant documentation, (1) To get Executive opinion about proposals Successful for players' contract review M3 Players' pay and contracts (2) To get board to approve his proposal for Successful contract/pay review M4 To improve the contribution To get board members to contribute Failed made by board members in resources: financial support, contacts to sponsorship, etc.
provide sponsorship, etc. M5 To change board composition (1) To get board support for his proposal to Successful recruit new, active members M6 To change board composition (2) To get board ratification for new job Successful descriptions and plans for new methods of appointments to board M7 To change board composition (3) To get help in implementing the proposal to Successful improve board composition M8 To change board composition (4) To get ratification to appoint a new chairman Successful when the existing one finishes his term M9 To change the structure of board To get Executive support for proposals Successful subcommittees M10 To change the structure of board To get board ratification for proposal Successful subcommittees M11 Programming (1) To keep the board from influencing opening Failed festival programming decisions M12 Programming (2) To keep the board from influencing opening Failed festival programming decisions M13 Appointment of artistic director To get Executive to agree that a meeting can Successful take place between him, one director, and the preferred candidate M14 Principal conductor contract To get ratification for proposal to offer Failed principal conductor a contract as guest principal conductor M15 Responding to Arts Council To get advice from the board on what to Failed announcing future funding say to the Arts Council M16 Cost cutting To get Finance subcommittee advice/ Successful approval on a proposal to cut string sections as a cost-saving device M17 Agreeing the budget To get Finance subcommittee advice about Failed how to agree the budget before the next board meeting M18 Funding for education work
To get Education subcommittee to discuss Failed whether opportunities exist to get additional funding for education work M19 Players' pay and contracts (3) To get Executive approval to give a pay rise Successful for following year M20 Collaboration
To get Finance subcommittee support for Successful 'close association' with other orchestra M21 Budget
To get board discussion/acceptance of budget Failed transcripts from other meetings, and field notes taken throughout the study.
The second stage of analysis focused on developing a set of core processes of CEO-board influence.
Stage 1: Identifying Influence Patterns and Influence Behaviours
The first step in the analysis was going through each meeting transcript to identify every influence attempt made by the CEO. An influence attempt was taken to be any occasion when the CEO raised an issue for discussion, put a proposal to the board, or sought to direct a decision outcome in a particular direction. For each influence attempt, four key elements were noted: the decision issue to which it related, its main objective (for example, to get ratification or to obtain resources), the behaviours displayed by the CEO in his attempts to influence the board, and the outcome of the attempt, including what happened immediately afterwards. Decisions discussed covered a wide range of issues, including acquisitions, appointments and contracts, artistic strategy, cost-cutting measures, and new income-generation activities. I constructed tables for each organization to display this information. For reasons of space, condensed versions of these tables are included here (see Tables 2 and 3 ). The next step of the meeting analysis was coding the observed CEO behaviours in more abstract terms, and then placing similar kinds of abstracted behaviours into groups. I assigned each one a provisional category name (for example, 'information sharing' and 'using allies'). An example is shown in Table 4 . Similar, although not identical, categories were developed for each organization.
I next analysed the 79 interview transcripts and notes. The first step here was identifying every reference that was made to CEO influence in the transcripts and notes. Some referred to the attempts I had witnessed in meetings; others were more general sets of perceptions about the CEO's influence. As with the meeting data, quotations were coded and themes identified (for example, 'not getting enough information') that captured the subject matter of several quotations. The quotations were placed into groups Using Allies
MSO SSO
ț Develops one proposal with key ț Several times develops proposals with director (M7) the chairman (S1, S2, S4, S14) ț Ensures valued director is appointed ț Prepares chairman prior to meeting (S23) chairman-elect (M8) ț Uses chairman in meeting to deliver ț Chairman-elect opposes his proposal proposal (S2) in meeting (-) (M14)
ț Invites significant external stakeholder to meeting to inform her and ensure her support (S24) ț Draws on chairman and chairman of Management Committee for support in meeting (S1) and provisional category names assigned to each (for example, 'information control' and 'key relationships'). An example is shown in Table 5 . Lastly, I reviewed archival documents and field notes. I analysed all meeting minutes and appended board papers for references to CEO-board influence, and also other documents, such as appraisal reports on the orchestras. I identified field notes that related to a meeting just attended, or other observations related to the nature of CEO influence in the organization. I collated quotations from all of these documents and from the field notes and assigned preliminary codes.
Stage 2: Developing the Core Dimensions
In this second stage, I developed core dimensions of the CEOs' approaches to influencing their boards. I did this first by working back and forth between the meeting data and that taken from the documentary data sources to develop a list of 60 influence behaviours, including perceptions of CEO influence behaviour. I then engaged in an iterative process, in which the influence behaviours were grouped into broader, more abstract categories (Strauss and Corbin 1998) . These categories included behaviours that demonstrated both positive (+) and negative (-) examples of influence behaviours; for instance, both 'CEO prepares Chairman prior to meeting' (+) and 'CEO does not develop social relationships with directors' (-) were included in the category 'Exploiting Key Relationships' (see Table 6 for the full categorization). Lastly, four robust categories were developed that parsimoniously described the main influence behaviours and differentiated between the success and failure of patterns of influence found across the two CEOs. To assess interrater reliability, a research assistant was then given the 60 cases of CEO influence behaviour to code as belonging to one of the four categories. He allocated 51 of them to the same category as the author, giving an inter-rater agreement of 85 percent. ț 'I intend to brief the Board on the ț 'I'm sure there are a lot of things that go outcome of these discussions at the between them that we never get to hear Board meeting. Until today, I was about. I think the feedback is probably not unaware that these discussions were as good as it should be to the board .... anything other than strictly confidential.
I think some of us feel sometimes we should It would now appear that both [the other be better informed.' (Player director) two local orchestras'] musicians have ț 'sometimes ... the board perhaps is not caught wind of something.' informed enough. It is, of course, difficult (CEO's memo to board) on a practical level to keep them informed ț 'The CE said he did not want to all the time, because you can't keep calling discuss this issue today, and again I meetings all the time, because they work wondered why he had introduced the so hard ... They have to put their trust in matter to this meeting.' (Field notes).
[the CEO] and [the chairman] and hope ț On whether musicians should be they're doing the right things.' (Manager) allowed to attend board sub ț 'I know there's a lot of things he committees: 'There's always a danger doesn't tell (the chairman). He always finds of the "us and them" thing. We out.' (Manager) shouldn't worry about control.' (CEO) Exploiting ț CEO discusses and develops two proposals with key director (+) ț CEO discusses and develops numerous proposals with chairman (+) relationships ț CEO is not supported by director in the meeting (-) ț CEO prepares chairman prior to meeting (+) ț CEO brings director he thinks he can work with into key board ț CEO uses chairman in meeting to deliver proposal (+) position (+) ț CEO gets support of allies in meetings (+) ț CEO changes appointment procedure for directors to get ț CEO invites a significant external party to board meeting to ensure individuals on the board that he thinks will make more buy-in to a proposal (+) of a contribution (+) ț CEO does not manage to influence the board when Chairman disagrees o CEO describes his interpersonal style as 'a colder fish ' (-) with him (-) o CEO has weak communication/relationship with o There is widespread agreement about the strength and importance chairman-elect (-) of the CEO-chairman relationship (+) o CEO is aware of the importance of having good relationships (+) o There is daily contact between the CEO and chairman (+) o CEO does not develop social relationships with directors (-) o Observations on how the CEO-chairman relationship drives the way o CEO explains the need to have different people on the board decisions are made (+) and different directors in the highest places (+) o CEO appoints two new directors (+) Managing ț CEO does not conceal his ignorance in meetings (-) ț CEO highlights the orchestra's successes to directors (+) impressions o CEO loses credibility when he reverses decisions that have ț CEO emphasizes the very demanding conditions under which the become public, having declared that they would not change (-) orchestra has to operate (+) o Director describes how he thinks that the CEO mistakenly made a ț In meetings, the CEO 'asks for guidance', emphasizing his role case for something he did not intend (-) as 'servant of the board' (+) o CEO is perceived as lacking commitment to the role and to o Internally, CEO gives the impression to others that the role he plays the orchestra (-) in decision making in this self-governing orchestra is minimal (+) o Externally, CEO makes more to others of the control he has -i.e., ensuring key stakeholders do not have the impression that the orchestra's decision making lies in the hands of musicians (+) Managing information ț CEO informs board of what he is hoping to do (-) ț CEO limits the amount of information that is given to the board (+) ț CEO informs board of one plan; says the other is still under ț CEO shares information once decisions are already underway/in hand (+) discussion (-) ț CEO informs directors when he wants to be able to say 'they knew what ț CEO informs board of recent activities, regardless of their decisions were being made' (+) success (-) ț CEO presents fait accompli to the board (+) ț CEO informs directors that a proposal already has support from ț CEO tells board that one subcommittee has already been informed (and another party (+) agrees/disagrees) (+) ț Things get out and embarrass CEO because he has not closely o CEO is at centre of information network, in daily contact with controlled access to information (-) multiple stakeholders (+) o CEO is comfortable with open information and consultation (-) o The existence of few formal meetings, with closely regulated o The existence of many mainly scheduled, formal meetings for attendance (+) which rules about attendance are quite relaxed (-) o Information is contained within the CEO-chairman team (+) o Directors have access to considerable information (-) o Keeping back information prevents directors from being able to prepare responses (+) o CEO holds back information from the chairman (+) 
CEO-Board Influence in the Orchestras
This section examines the overall patterns of CEO influence in the two orchestras, which were markedly different in each case. The following descriptions draw from direct observation of the two CEOs' behaviour in board and board subcommittee meetings, as well as interview and documentary data, and focuses on both the degree to which each CEO was successful in his influence attempts in board meetings as well as his more general pattern of influence in and out of meetings.
CEO Influence in the SSO
In the years prior to the study, the SSO had undergone an extremely tense period, when, as part of changes to orchestral funding in Britain, it had been in danger of losing its entire public grant. The CEO had fought hard to save the orchestra; his success gained him much appreciation among the orchestra musicians. At the start of the study period, the CEO had been in post for several years, coming to the orchestra with a background in the arts. He was a man of considerable experience, and was well networked in the arts sector. The detailed analysis of the SSO's CEO's influence attempts in meetings (see Table 2 ) reveals the considerable success he had in influencing his board. Of the 29 attempts observed, the CEO was successful in all but two of them. At different times and in different meetings, he managed to get his proposals accepted, to obtain opinions from board members, and to influence the way directors behaved in a meeting attended by an important external stakeholder. He also experienced two influence failures: (1) an attempt to get the members of his Management Committee (a board subcommittee) to ratify a proposal to change the structure of the orchestra's fundraising group (attempt S12) and (2) an attempt to prevent the board from increasing its involvement on certain administrative staffing decisions (attempt S18). In each of these instances, the chairman argued against the CEO's proposition and a decision was not reached in the meeting.
The CEO's ability to influence his board was not only evident in the meetings he attended. Drawing on data from interviews, observation, and archival analysis, the systemic nature of his influence was apparent. The CEO and the chairman were seen as a strong leadership team, the CEO driving key financial and strategic decisions and the chairman providing direction on personnel matters. Within this team, the CEO was regarded as an influential figure. Despite statements from SSO members about the limited formal authority the CEO possessed and his 'willingness to subjugate his wishes to the board' (chairman, SSO), the CEO was quite widely perceived as having considerable power and influence in organizational decisions. When an ex-board member was asked about the CEO's role in decision-making, he explained:
'The way [the CEO] works is, he doesn't tell [the chairman] what he's doing until ... something's wedged firmly in the pipeline and is going towards the end -it's not a nebulous idea, it's really set in motion, and by which time it's too late to change it.' (Ex-player board member, SSO) Also emphasizing the extent of the CEO's influence, a member of the administration compared the roles of the CEO and chairman: 'at the end of the day, [the chairman] is the tops, but I do think [the CEO] is the centre' (administrator, SSO). Interviews with board members and others revealed the amount of respect the CEO engendered: he was generally seen as very experienced, well informed and connected, and highly political. At the same time, the musicians were extremely busy and so were generally grateful to have someone providing clear direction for the organization. Player board members were thus comfortable that decisions were made by someone with greater skill and experience than they, especially because they could see the positive results achieved in recent years. Equally, the external board directors, who in any case were furnished with only limited facts on which to base their judgements, saw a successful operation running, and did not interfere. The SSO was an organization in which the CEO exercised considerable influence.
CEO Influence in the MSO
As with the SSO, CEO-board influence in the MSO needs to be understood in the historical context in which it was observed. The MSO had greater security in its public funding than did the SSO, but at the time of the study period, it was operating with a reduced grant and a growing deficit. It had also experienced some significant changes in the previous years, including two changes of CEO and the appointment of a new principal conductor. After this time of flux, organizational members looked to the new CEO for the leadership they believed the orchestra greatly needed. The present CEO had been head of the organization for almost a year. While he had been associated with the MSO for some years, he did not have an arts-sector background.
The detailed analysis of the SSO's CEO's influence attempts in meetings (see Table 3 ) reveals this CEO's relative lack of success in influencing his board. Of the 21 attempts observed, he was successful in influencing the board in only 12 of them. His failures included attempts to get support, advice, and resources from his board, as well as occasions when he sought to reduce board involvement in a decision and to influence what was discussed in a board subcommittee meeting. Indeed, it appeared that some of his successes in getting board approval for a proposal often happened by default. When he presented a proposal on a subject on which members did not feel they had particular expertise (for example, the players' pay and contract negotiations (attempt M2) or issues around reducing the size of the orchestra (attempt M16)), they were generally quick to agree to his suggestions. On some of these occasions, however, what he really sought was advice, which, even when he explicitly asked for it, he failed to obtain. The CEO's lack of board influence was evident not only in the meetings he attended. Data from interviews, observation, and archival analysis reinforces these results. When the CEO had taken up his position a year before the start of the study period, musicians, administration, and the organization's directors all had high hopes for him. The board and previous CEO had received harsh criticism for recent decisions; many waited expectantly for the new CEO to take charge. During the study period, he brought about some valuable changes, especially obtaining additional funding for the orchestra and negotiating some financially advantageous changes to the principal conductor's contract. He also made significant changes to the composition of the board, including a change in chairman. As the months passed, however, he was increasingly seen by organizational members and by some external parties as failing to get what was needed from the MSO board. The Arts Council, the orchestra's primary funder, expressed particular concern both at the board's lack of direction and the CEO's failure to provide it. Shortly before the end of the study period, he resigned from his position.
The CEOs of the two organizations described here clearly differed in the extent to which, and ways in which, they influenced their boards. What is striking is that in the SSO, the organization in which the CEO might have been expected to have more difficulty directing board activities (because of its strong self-governing structure and ideology), he was influential in virtually every major decision that arose during the study period, regardless of the issue in question. Only when he lacked the support of the chairman did he fail to achieve his objective. In contrast, in the MSO, where board members keenly awaited leadership and direction, the CEO very frequently failed in his attempts to influence the board, across a range of different decision issues.
Four Key Influence Processes
In this section, I examine the influence exhibited by these two CEOs more closely, investigating why one CEO was so much more successful than the other in getting what he needed from his board. I argue that the answer lies beyond differences evident in the board's structure and composition, and, significantly, in the types of influence behaviours in which the two CEOs engaged. Specifically, the data analysis revealed four behavioural processes that were strongly associated with successful influence: exploiting key relationships, managing impressions, managing information, and protecting formal authority. In this section, I examine each of these behavioural processes, in particular, looking at their role in explaining the CEOs' patterns of influence and their connection to existing research on governance and influence.
Exploiting Key Relationships
The first critical process that distinguishes CEO influencing behaviour in the two organizations is concerned with the relationships that they developed with key directors and organizational stakeholders. In the SSO, these relationships were central to the CEO's ability to influence his board. A particularly important one was with the chairman, which he used in a number of ways, such as working with him to develop and refine proposals and keeping him informed of other projects to facilitate their acceptance when put to the board (for example, attempts S1, S2, S4, and S14). This was effective: the chairman was usually very supportive of the CEO's proposals and spoke persuasively of their benefits to other directors. Through the strong relationship he maintained with the chairman, the CEO thus had a key ally to use in influencing board opinion.
The strength and significance of the relationship was acknowledged by the CEO and chairman, and by others throughout the organization. A member of the administration, for example, described the very significant role played by the CEO-chairman team, observing: 'They have to be able to get on, because they have to work so closely together. They're on the phone to each other every night ... their wives must get fed up with it ... Their relationship is essential to the well-being of the orchestra.' (Administrator, SSO) The chairman explained how he and the CEO worked together to develop the orchestra's strategy:
'[The CEO] and I speak on the phone for about an hour a day if we don't meet, and we go through all the initiatives, and he tells me exactly what's going on ... I'd be asking him what are the impacts for the finance of the orchestra, and for the program planning of the orchestra, and he'd be asking me what would be the concerns of the orchestra in negotiating something like that. And between us we'll devise a strategy which means that the eventual outcome will suit what we're doing.' (Chairman, SSO) The significance of the CEO-chairman relationship was particularly evident on the occasions on which the CEO had not garnered the chairman's support. Such was the case in the two instances in which the CEO failed to influence his board. In one, the chairman did not feel he had enough information to agree to the CEO's proposal, and a decision was deferred until it could be discussed further (attempt S12). In the other, the chairman was adamant that he and the board should have more involvement in decisions regarding levels of staffing on tours, an area currently handled by a senior administrator (attempt S18). The CEO insisted, 'There's no problem with the board knowing, but it must be [the administrator's] decision' (CEO, Orchestra Committee meeting, SSO). The chairman refused to give in, and the issue was not resolved in the meeting.
In addition to this key relationship with his chairman, the CEO also maintained close contact with a wide variety of other important stakeholders, including the chairman of the Management Committee, the orchestra president, and an enormous number of agents, conductors, promoters, and other colleagues in the business. Many of these relationships helped him influence the board in a less direct way than his relationship with the chairman: because of his close connections to numerous key stakeholders, he was usually the best informed person in the boardroom on any significant matter and so able to speak persuasively on a range of issues.
This approach can be clearly contrasted with that of the MSO's CEO. Table  3 contains very few instances in which this CEO used key relationships with directors or others to influence the MSO board; indeed, he did not have a close association with any of his directors or stakeholders more broadly. The effect of the rather weak relationship between the CEO and chairman-elect was demonstrated during the critical principal conductor's contract-renewal decision. At the meeting described briefly at the start of this article, the CEO's proposal not to renew the conductor's contract was rejected by the board (attempt M14). In a subsequent interview, the chairman-elect described how surprised he had been to hear the CEO's proposal in the meeting, despite previous conversations they had had on the matter:
'Somewhere in the back of my poor old brain is a feeling that he must've said something [previously] along those lines, but it didn't register as being in that way ... But it certainly really took me aback, and I didn't want to undermine him and say, "My God, what are you doing?", but I did feel I had to say what I did.' (Chairmanelect, MSO) Although the MSO's CEO did consult with the chairman-elect outside formal meetings, it appears that these discussions were infrequent and evidently sometimes lacked clarity.
This first influence process, exploiting key relationships, has several important connections to, and implications for, existing research on organizational governance. While structural approaches to governance have noted the significance of the number of social ties existing between CEOs and their board directors (Johnson et al. 1993; Judge and Zeithaml 1992) , the findings of the present study suggest that a CEO's ability to influence may be significantly determined by the strength of a relationship with one particular board member. In the SSO, the CEO had developed an extremely powerful relationship with his chairman, and, through this strong tie, was able to exert significant influence over the rest of the board. It may be that the CEO's strong relationship with his chairman gave him the advantage that structural theories of governance equate with CEO duality (for example, Daily and Dalton 1994; Westphal and Zajac 1995) , but without the need for both roles to be held by one individual.
This finding is consistent with processual research that has shown the importance of the relationship between the CEO and chairman (for example, McNulty and Pettigrew 1999; Roberts and Stiles 1999) , and complements this literature by highlighting aspects of the mutually beneficial nature of this relationship. In their careful examination of the chairman-CEO relationship, Roberts and Stiles (1999) revealed the importance of having a close and trusting relationship that permits CEOs and chairmen to negotiate complementary roles in organizational governance. In the present study, while responsibilities were somewhat divided between the CEO and chairman, they worked well together on many matters, rarely competing over an issue or position, and so, were able to present a united front to other board members. Moreover, because the chairman used the relationship to ensure that decisions were made in the interests of the players, the CEO, while highly influential, did not typically take decisions that went against the welfare of these stakeholders. In the SSO, the CEO influenced his board through his relationship with his chairman, but the chairman clearly also drew on the relationship to develop his own powerbase in the organization. Counter to some traditional conceptualizations of power, the present study thus suggests that power and influence in the CEO-board relationship is not a zero-sum entity (the board having more influence when the CEO has less). On the contrary, the findings of this study add to those of McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) , Roberts and Stiles (1999) , and others by showing that CEO influence over the board can increase with at least one of the same mechanisms that increases board influence in governance. It also highlights the value of having strong relationships with stakeholders more broadly.
Several studies in the corporate governance literature have emphasized CEOs' efforts to influence their boards by changing their composition (for example, Boeker and Goodstein 1991; Goodstein and Boeker 1991; Westphal and Zajac 1995) . Interestingly, in the present study, while the MSO's CEO succeeded in changing his board's composition, appointing new directors and a chairman-elect, this did not make a significant difference to his level of influence. In the SSO, in contrast, where the CEO had no say in the appointment of any of the internal directors making up the majority of the board, he nevertheless maintained considerable sway over them through the dominant coalition he formed with his chairman. Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) note the significance of the 'stable alliances' formed in politically active top management teams, but traditional notions of board composition and independence have tended to underplay the importance of one or more particularly significant CEO-director relationships in determining CEO influence. The importance of key alliances has been emphasized in the literature on power and influence, where power is shown to be acquired and exercised through allies that may be appointed, promoted, or won through favours (Pfeffer 1992) . Indeed, the relational aspect of power is emphasized in many contemporary conceptualizations, where it is seen as generated, maintained, and lost in the context of relationships with others (McNulty and Pettigrew 1996) . The CEO's alliance with his chairman was a particularly key element in his influence success in this self-governing organization, where the notion of a musician-led orchestra held such a central role in members' organizational identity.
In summary, the present study thus suggests that a critical factor in explaining a CEO's degree of influence over the board is the existence of strong ties to other key stakeholders, and in particular, to a director, as well as a willingness on the part of the CEO to use these relationships to influence decision-making. The study also indicates that the value of a CEO-director relationship will be increased to the degree that the director is well connected to other directors, and so able to have an influence on them through these relationships. In more concrete terms, an influential CEO is likely to have frequent interaction with a key director, both during work hours and probably also outside of work, in more social settings. The results suggest that CEOs use these discussions to effect influence by exchanging views about upcoming issues, developing and refining proposals collaboratively, and reflecting on the success of recent activities. Furthermore, CEOs are most able to influence their boards when such key relationships are characterized by a high level of trust and openness.
Managing Impressions
Impression management is the second key process that distinguishes the behaviours used by the two CEOs to influence their boards. In the SSO, the CEO projected a variety of positive impressions to a range of different groups and individuals. To his board, he displayed an image of competence and legitimacy, describing the orchestra's many successes, while highlighting the very difficult conditions under which they had been achieved. The clear message conveyed was that, despite the vagaries of the government and the marketplace, the orchestra was doing extremely well -thanks to its excellent leadership. In meetings, he came across as extremely well informed, and confident that he was doing the best for the orchestra. Backed up by the orchestra's evident accomplishments, directors felt they were fortunate to have such an individual as their CEO, and allowed themselves to be led by him. At the same time, however, the CEO minimized the significance that should be accorded to his role in the orchestra's governance and decisionmaking, a sensitive matter for a proudly self-governing organization. In meetings, he frequently asked his directors for 'guidance', and although he often did not act upon the opinions he was given, this mock-consultation formed part of the impression he gave of his participative style. The CEO, who talked daily with a wide range of conductors, agents, recording companies, and others, also managed impressions of the external environment given to his directors. This had a significant effect on decision-making at times, such as when he defended a decision to field two orchestras from one pool of players (attempt S23) by assuring directors that it would not be an issue for the event sponsors. In general, the CEO was seen by his directors as extremely skilled, knowledgeable, wily, and competent.
In contrast, the MSO's CEO did not use impression management to his benefit. Indeed, at times, he did not seem aware of the negative impressions that others were forming of him. Although he could speak quite confidently in board meetings, he did not attempt to conceal his ignorance on certain matters, and asked openly for advice in ways that suggested a lack of control on his part. In one board meeting, he beseeched his directors: 'Please can anyone tell me something to say to [the Music Director of the Arts Council]?' (attempt M15). Such requests cannot have increased his credibility in the eyes of the MSO board. Indeed, directors sometimes wondered if he had intended to say what he had, as in the case of the principal conductor's contract renewal (attempt M14), after which the chairman-elect commented: '[The CEO 's] proposal that he [the current principal conductor] become Principal Guest Conductor was a non-runner, albeit that I don't think he meant it to come out in that way.' In decisions that were taking a long time to reach resolution, such as the principal conductor's contract renewal (attempt M14) and the players' contract review and pay freeze (attempt M2 and M3), the CEO gave the impression that he was waiting for others to take decisive action. There were other occasions when he was seen to reverse decisions he had made, for example concerning programming (attempt M11) and plans to reduce the size of the orchestra as a cost-cutting measure (attempt M16). As time passed, directors and other organizational members expressed concerns about the CEO's commitment to the job, commenting on the strict office hours he kept, and, on tour, his failure to attend key concerts and sponsor receptions. These observations seemed, in part, to reflect a lack of positive impression management on the part of the CEO.
Impression management has been acknowledged as a critically important skill for CEOs (Chen and Meindl 1991; Sutton and Kramer 1990) , and in particular, as a significant influencing mechanism (for example, Kipnis and Schmidt 1988; Westphal 1998) . The SSO's CEO used several impressionmanagement strategies that have been identified in the literature, including selfpromotion (Giacalone and Rosenfeld 1986) , disclosure of obstacles to successful performance (Giacalone and Riordan 1990) , and offering legitimizing accounts (Bies and Sitkin 1992) . In isolation, these strategies might not have been enough to convince members of the board for more than a short time, but in combination with evidence of the organization's success, they allowed the SSO's CEO to recover from his mistakes and to continue to obtain resources. In contrast, the MSO's CEO exemplified the problems that come from being associated with an underperforming organization. In an examination of the stigma associated with bankruptcy in firms, Sutton and Callahan (1987) identify the negative ways in which an organization's audiences respond to perceptions of organizational ineffectiveness, including disengagement, reduction in the quality of participation, and denigration of the organization and its leaders. During the course of the study period, the MSO received quite severe press criticism on artistic grounds. Some directors responded in the ways identified by Sutton and Callahan, separating themselves and disengaging from the stigmatized organization. The CEO, however, failed to adopt a 'stigmamanagement strategy' (Sutton and Callahan 1987) which distinguished him from its decline. As a consequence, his powers of influence over his board diminished still further, until finally he was asked to resign.
In sum, these findings suggest that a CEO's degree of influence over the board is tied to the extent to which he or she succeeds in creating, for directors, an impression of competence and legitimacy. Specifically, the study suggests that an influential CEO is one who comes across as confident and well informed, both about the organization's activities and plans, and also about the external environment in which it is operating. Influential CEOs are likely to show themselves not only as knowledgeable, however, but also as in control, able to 'work the system' to the organization's advantage. Further, they give the impression of being extremely committed to the job and to the organization. At the same time, and very critically, the results of this study suggest that CEOs are more likely to influence their boards successfully when they manage to associate themselves and their actions with the organization's successes and disassociate themselves from its difficulties or failures. This is clearly made easier in the case of a high-performing organization, especially if it has previously been performing less well. However, the CEO who gives the impression of being instrumental in the organization's accomplishments (however great or small) will build greater credibility with the board, and as a result achieve greater influence in decision-making.
Managing Information
The third key CEO-board influence process is concerned with the CEO's approach to information management. This involves gathering, holding, and concealing information, as well as disseminating it to certain key parties at strategically advantageous times. A considerable amount of information in the SSO was carefully controlled by the CEO. He was at the very centre of the SSO's network, in regular contact with agents, conductors, soloists, and others, and so had the best access to information on all matters other than those directly concerning player personnel, which were part of the chairman's domain. There were relatively few formal meetings: the board and its Management subcommittee (the external directors plus the chairman) met quarterly, while the Orchestra subcommittee (the player directors) met on a more ad hoc and informal basis.
As described earlier, it was in daily discussions with the chairman that the CEO shared information on most critical issues. These discussions, however, usually remained exclusive to the two of them until they were ready to take them to the next stage (for example, attempts S1, S4, S13, S14, and S24), something that did not go unnoticed by other player directors. In interview, one commented: 'I'm sure there are a lot of things that go between them that we never get to hear about. I think the feedback is probably not as good as it should be to the board ... I think some of us feel sometimes we should be better informed.' (Player board member, SSO) One effect of the CEO-chairman team's information control was that directors could feel presented with a fait accompli in meetings, and simply had to go along with decisions that had tacitly already been made. A few musicians, including one board member, described the board as a 'rubber stamp'. An ex-player director, for example, described his disillusionment:
'the players that are on the board really aren't given enough information about what goes on in order to make really informed judgments. It's almost as if we're a puppet, a giant rubber stamp, to act as a sort of buffer to people for the real management, which is [the CEO], and the Trust, [the chairman of the Management Committee], and [the chairman], to some extent. They run things. We can't get enough information ... So I feel it's very much, it's a bit of a facade.' (Ex-player board member, SSO) At times, the CEO introduced an idea in a board meeting by saying, 'This has already been approved by the Management [or Orchestra] Committee,' encouraging the assembled company to ratify it with no further debate.
The analysis of board meetings (see Table 2 ) indicates that an important aspect of information management for the SSO's CEO was providing members with an ongoing update of his progress in decision-making in certain areas. Sometimes he was quite explicit in saying that he just wanted 'to give it the green light' (attempt S12) or explaining, 'I don't want to make too big a thing of this. What I want is for you to know' (attempt S28). This was particularly so when the decision had potential negative repercussions, such as when fielding two orchestras (attempts S5 and S23). In this case, the CEO seemed to want to ensure that board members could not suggest that they had been unaware of the decision process leading up to it, even if they had not, in fact, had an influence over it. It is not clear, of course, that this level of information control necessarily led to better decisions, since the CEO may have failed to take advantage of the board's knowledge and expertise at times. Nevertheless, it did ensure that he wielded a significant influence in such meetings.
In contrast, information in the MSO was very freely available. Many formal meetings were held here, most scheduled well in advance. These included the board and its three subcommittees, as well as a Consultative Committee (musicians and some board members) and its three subcommittees. Through this extensive meeting network, and the rather relaxed rules about attendance at these meetings (the presence of individuals not officially on the board or on a subcommittee typically went unchallenged) directors could keep themselves informed of plans they might want to influence. Most board members did not do so, but those that did had access to much of the information they required. Thus it was relatively easy for directors to become involved in decision-making processes, including those which the CEO would have rather they had not, such as programming (attempts M11 and M12).
Another effect of this open climate of communication was that directors were often quick to hear of certain problems in the organization, which diminished their confidence in the CEO and increased their motivation to become involved in decision-making themselves. For example, on several occasions, the two player directors became concerned about an impending decision or about possible repercussions from something the CEO had done or failed to do. At these times, they made private telephone calls to the chairman-elect to discuss appropriate action, or asked to have a private meeting with the CEO. In the middle of very confidential discussions about a collaborative venture with another orchestra (attempt M20), the CEO received a telephone call from a local journalist about to run the story. The CEO quickly sent a memo to his board, explaining:
'I intend to brief the board on the outcome of these discussions at the board meeting. Until today, I was unaware that these discussions were anything other than strictly confidential. It would now appear that both [XSO] and [YSO] musicians have caught wind of something.' (Memo to board, MSO) This was another example of how the CEO's lack of information control diminished his ability to influence his board at the time and in the ways he might have wished.
Information is known to be a critical source of power in organizations (French and Raven 1959; Pfeffer 1981) , and in the present study emerged as an important factor in CEO-board influence -specifically, the careful control of information. Thus what was important was not only how much directors received, but exactly when in the decision process they received it, the extent to which pieces of information came as a surprise, and also whether they appeared to have surprised the CEO, thereby suggesting a lack of leadership control. The decision-making and involvement literatures highlight the relationship between access to information and involvement in decision processes (for example, Heller et al. 1998; Wall and Lischeron 1977) , showing that parties are more likely to influence decisions when they have the relevant information. Less is known, however, about how a lack of leadership control in the dissemination of information affects that leader's overall ability to influence key stakeholders. Indeed, the finding in this study adds important contingencies to the conclusion drawn by Herman and Heimovics (1990a: 176) that effective CEOs are those who provide their boards with 'decision-relevant, timely information'. From the present study, it appears that influential CEOs are those who share information with a member of a dominant coalition, while tightly controlling the timing and amount of information given to the rest of the board. This dynamic illustrates the interplay between the control of information and the setting and manipulating of agendas and decision-making processes, as highlighted by Lukes (1974) and by Bacharach and Baratz (1962) . One of the underlying assumptions of managerial hegemony theory is that because CEOs generally have better access to key information than do their board members, the board inevitably becomes a passive management tool (Kosnik 1987; Pfeffer 1972) . The findings of the present study show, however, that having access to such information does not by itself enable strong leadership -it is the way in which it is managed and shared that is especially critical.
To conclude, information management constitutes a critical element in CEO-board influence. This study suggests that for CEOs to have greatest influence over their boards, they must be capable of gathering relevant data, and having obtained this information, make an assessment of the point in the decision process at which it should be imparted to others. This means that CEOs are influential to the extent that they initially hold on to or even conceal the information they possess, sharing it with their key director, but disseminating it more widely only at a much later stage. In order to exercise this information control, the CEO both needs to have a central place in the network, permitting him or her to access information that others cannot, but also to behave astutely once in possession of that information. The study here suggests that influential CEOs are not those that never share what they know (for this could leave board members feeling uncomfortably ill-informed), but rather share just enough and at just the right times that they maintain their unique position in the information network.
Protecting Formal Authority
The final CEO-board influence process emerging from this study is the extent to which the CEOs protected the formal authority that came with their position. The SSO's CEO embraced the authority of his role, taking care that it was not encroached upon by others and working to extend it where possible. He tended to behave authoritatively in meetings with the board, seeking to influence the direction of all major decisions. Although he humbly cast himself as a 'servant of the board', often telling board members that he was 'asking for guidance', he usually came to these meetings with clear proposals, which he explained and defended with confidence. The CEO was willing to hear what others had to say, but did not believe that they were better placed than he to make key decisions. He enjoyed the authority he had as CEO of the SSO, and was not afraid to exercise it.
The CEO was also careful to ensure that no one else in the orchestra's administration encroached on his formal authority. This helped him to retain a significant influence over the board, since the directors could achieve little by dealing with his colleagues instead of with him when a decision had to be made. No one else in the administration had the authority to make important strategic decisions, as the marketing manager commented:
'At the end of the day, me sitting here is a minuscule influence on programming. I just sell what I'm given. ' (Marketing manager, SSO) In addition, the CEO made sure that outsiders were accorded relatively little authority over SSO decision-making. In drawing up the contract of the principal conductor appointed during the study period, the CEO ensured that the conductor's powers were clearly delineated, and minimized as far as possible. This was a matter of considerable importance to the players of this self-governing orchestra, but also had major implications for the role the CEO would continue to play in its governance. If the principal conductor had the right to make artistic decisions for the orchestra, the CEO's influence would be significantly reduced. It is not clear whether this approach, in which the CEO maintained unilateral authority, led to optimal decision-making. What is evident, though, is that it allowed the CEO to build and sustain his influence in the organization's governance.
The MSO's CEO, in contrast, did not fully exercise the authority that came with the position. As described earlier in the article, he quite often asked for directors' views on what he ought to do, and, in contrast to the SSO's CEO, took these suggestions seriously. He was willing to let others take a lead role in decision-making, seeming unaware of how this diminished his own influence over the board. In meetings, he sometimes allowed the agenda to be diverted, so that certain matters he tabled never got discussed, while issues on which he wanted to minimize board input, such as programming, were debated at considerable length. For example, despite telling directors that 'we cannot have programming done by committee' (attempt M11) and declaring of the orchestra's artistic plans 'I own what is happening now' (attempt M12), the programme for the opening festival was nevertheless discussed in some detail in the board meeting, and subsequently modified in line with directors' suggestions. Indeed, despite poor decisions ratified by the MSO board in previous years, the CEO nevertheless seemed willing to accept board members' directions on a number of issues. For example, a board member described the decision process that had taken place at a meeting to discuss the principal conductor's contract:
'Two board members between them effectively discussed, although in open forum, what they thought should best happen, and said to [the CEO], "go away and write the paper and we'll take it from there".' (Staff director, SSO) Almost a year later, the CEO was still receiving instructions from his board which he appeared willing to follow -even when he was not completely clear what they were.
In a number of important areas, the MSO's CEO was not concerned to guard the formal authority that he possessed. At the time of the study, the CEO was working to rein in some of the decision-making powers of the principal conductor. Some years earlier, the principal conductor had been granted the authority to make a wide range of artistic decisions, for which he was formally accountable to the board. However, the CEO did not want responsibility for these artistic decisions himself, and was keen to appoint an artistic director, to whom he could delegate such matters. In a similar vein, he was also comfortable to have the chairman-elect take on a very direct role in the principal conductor contract negotiations, and more broadly, to encourage the board at large to become involved in developing an artistic strategy for the organization. As a result, board members' perceptions of their roles were encouraged to grow in quite the opposite way experienced by those sitting on the SSO board, while the CEO's influence diminished considerably.
While contemporary studies of power and influence have emphasized relational, processual, and disciplinary power in organizations (for example , Brocklehurst 2001; Courpasson 2000; Knights and McCabe 1999) , the present research highlights the critical role that formal authority still plays in CEO-board relations. Unlike traditional studies of authority, however, the findings of this study point to its socially constructed and negotiated character. In both organizations, the CEOs and boards engaged in processes and behaviours that worked to reconstruct the CEO's authority, either strengthening or undermining it. The approach taken by the MSO's CEO seems to conflict with governance research in both the private and non-profit sectors, which has emphasized the tendency of CEOs to maintain or increase their authority (Walsh and Seward 1990) . In the MSO, the CEO did not fail to maintain his authority but, rather, actively worked to distribute it among other organizational members. The approach taken by the SSO's CEO also raises interesting questions about the role of authority in CEO-board relations. He ensured that no one in the organization encroached on the authority that came with his position, while at the same time taking care to downplay its significance to others. Talking about the importance of the organization's independence and emphasizing its self-governing structure, he drew up a contract for the new principal conductor which not only satisfied the concerns of the player board members, but which at the same time left his own decisionmaking powers uncurtailed. Thus one of the key ways in which the CEO maintained his influence over the board was by ensuring that no other party in the organization became more powerful, and able to challenge his authority.
In summary, the present study suggests that a critical factor in explaining a CEO's degree of influence over the board is the extent to which he or she holds on to and extends the authority that comes with the position. Influential CEOs are those who both are willing to exercise the power that the role of CEO offers and who ensure that other individuals or stakeholder groups are not given the opportunity to acquire more authority over decision-making.
It therefore appears that CEOs effect influence by maintaining direct involvement in decision-making and behaving authoritatively in meetings, preventing others from diverting the agenda. CEOs also become influential to the extent that they do not delegate important matters to others in the organization: this study suggests that CEO-board influence is likely to be greatest when the CEO ensures that decision-making structures and processes are centralized around the CEO.
CEO-Board Influence as a Set of Interrelated and Embedded Processes
In the preceding section, four critical behavioural processes were described through which CEOs influence their boards. Here, I consider the interrelated and embedded nature of these processes. Recent governance research has highlighted the importance of contextual factors for our understanding of the CEO-board relationship (for example, Pettigrew 1996, 1999; Stiles 2001) . In this section, I first discuss how the four processes work together and play off one another to form a powerful configuration, and then examine the way in which this configuration is embedded in both its temporal and organizational contexts.
Influence as a Set of Interconnected Processes
While each of the four processes independently contributes to the influence that a CEO can exert over his or her board, they become a truly powerful set of influence mechanisms as a result of the interplay that takes place between them. For example, building and exploiting key relationships is a particularly fundamental influence process which seems to facilitate many other influencing activities. This dynamic was clearly evident in the SSO. Here, as the CEO exploited his relationships with his chairman and others, he not only increased the likelihood of getting support for his proposals in board meetings, but was also able to glean valuable information that allowed him to be at the centre of the SSO's stakeholder network. From this powerful position, the CEO was well placed to control the organization's primary information channels and to manage impressions both of the organization and his leadership of it. Through skilled impression management, the CEO simultaneously projected an image of personal competence and promoted a view of his limited power as CEO of a self-governing organization. This in turn enabled him to exercise considerable formal authority over the board.
This view of influence as a set of interconnected processes contrasts with much of the influence literature, in which influence is portrayed as comprising a number of distinct tactics, such as 'ingratiation', 'pressure', and 'upward appeals' (for example, Kipnis and Schmidt 1988; Yukl and Falbe 1990) , any one of which might be adopted for a given influence attempt, depending upon its objective. In contrast, the present study shows that influence behaviours are not a set of discrete activities operating independently and to the exclusion of each other. On the contrary, we see that influence in organizations is made up of complex, multifaceted, and ongoing processes that interact with one another to produce their greatest effects in combination. Building upon influence research in the more process-oriented tradition (for example, Pettigrew and McNulty 1995, 1998) , the present study identifies specific behavioural mechanisms used by CEOs and explains how they work together to increase or diminish the influence that these CEOs have over their boards.
Influence as Temporally Embedded Processes
A second and related aspect of influence as described in this article is its temporal nature. The four influence processes identified here not only work together in concert, as described above. They also interact with each other over time with cumulative effects, creating self-perpetuating cycles that can amplify a CEO's influence, or alternatively, generating negative spirals of influence failure (Maitlis and Lawrence 2003) . The SSO provides a positive example of this dynamic. By exploiting relationships with his chairman and other significant stakeholders, and through both the information control afforded by his position in the network and some careful impression management, the SSO's CEO established a situation in which his formal authority had the potential to grow. As board members perceived his effectiveness as a leader, they came to value him more and more, trusting him to exert his authority over decisions they believed he probably best understood. This CEO's influence over his board was thus strong and selffuelling, the processes through which he operated becoming embedded in the organization's decision-making rules over time.
Looking at the MSO, we can see how this feedback mechanism can also work against a CEO. Despite making changes to the structure and composition of his board, the MSO's CEO failed to develop strong relationships with any of his directors, or indeed with anyone else in the MSO network. Partly as a result, he remained relatively ill-informed about matters within and external to the organization, and was not therefore in a strong position to manage either the information or the impressions that others received. As time passed, board members with easy access to information and with decreasing confidence in their executive leadership began to challenge the authority of the CEO. His influence over the board, never very powerful, spiralled downwards until he eventually stepped down from his position. In this organization, the CEO's failure to exploit his relationships, his lack of information and impression management, and his tendency not to exercise the authority that came with his position, combined over time to minimize the role that he could play in organizational decision-making.
These self-perpetuating cycles capture a temporal aspect of influence in organizations that is often overlooked in studies of governance, where crosssectional measures are commonly used to examine the relationships between structural features of the board and CEO influence (for example, Westphal and Zajac 1995; Westphal 1999) . Even research using time-series data to investigate CEOs' responses to changes in board structure (for example, Westphal 1998) addresses change only across two time points, limiting the insights that can be gained about how influence operates in a non-linear fashion over time. Furthermore, such work focuses solely on the direct effect of structure on behaviour, failing to take into account the lagged effects of influence on influence, that is, how enacting one set of influence behaviours may produce results that themselves trigger further influence activities, which in turn affect decision-making.
Influence as Contextually Embedded Processes
The influence processes described in this article are embedded not only in time, but also and critically in the organizational contexts in which they are enacted. Thus, to understand why a CEO might or might not be able to implement these processes, it is necessary to examine how CEOs may be helped by the existence of certain resources in their operating contexts, or hindered by their absence. Some important resources derive from aspects of an organization's history. For example, when the SSO's CEO managed impressions of his competence, he did so with a set of stakeholders who had, just a few years earlier, witnessed his success in saving the orchestra from dire funding cuts. He also did so in the context of an organization that was going from strength to strength both artistically and financially during the course of the study period. In contrast, the MSO's CEO came into an organization whose former head had been forced to resign because of poor decision-making. The new job incumbent was under the close scrutiny of numerous parties, watching to see if he could do what was necessary to improve the orchestra's performance. This CEO did not have an established reputation upon which to build, and as time passed and the orchestra continued to struggle, it only became harder to present a competent image to those around him. Thus, while the SSO's CEO drew on capital such as his personal reputation in the position and relatively concrete evidence of the organization's success to promote an image of competence and expertise, the MSO's history and unfolding performance provided no such resources.
Features of an organization's structure can also serve as important resources in a leader's ability to enact key influence behaviours. For example, in the SSO, the CEO was instrumental in drawing up a contract that strictly limited the authority of the incoming principal conductor. As noted earlier, this was in keeping with the fervently expressed values of the musicians, but at the same time aided the CEO in protecting his own authority. The MSO's CEO, in contrast, was appointed into an organization in which the board had, several years earlier, accorded extensive rights to the principal conductor. While the board encouraged the CEO to try to rein in the principal conductor's powers, the MSO clearly represents a context in which it was harder for the CEO to protect his formal authority -since he had first to build it. The interplay between structure and CEO influence seen here is somewhat counter-intuitive: given the SSO's 'self-governing' structure, one might expect it to have provided fewer opportunities for CEO influence than the MSO's more traditional structure.
While contextually based resources thus play a critical role in understanding how influence happens (and fails to happen), they may do so in ways that might not be predicted by a strictly structural perspective on organizational governance (for example, Daily and Dalton 1994; Westphal and Zajac 1995; Zajac and Westphal 1996) . CEO behaviour in these orchestras was not determined purely by organizational structure or context, but resulted from the interplay of individuals with certain skill sets operating in contexts that had the potential to both help and hinder them. These findings substantiate arguments put forward by several writers (for example, Brass and Burkhardt 1993; Frost 1986; Pettigrew and McNulty 1995, 1998) that to understand fully how influence happens in organizations, we must also investigate how features of the context enable and constrain those working within them. Thus, it is useful to conceptualize the context as a set of resources on which CEOs may draw or may fail to draw, depending upon their skills and aims.
Conclusion
This study contributes to research on organizational governance through a close examination of the behavioural dynamics that underpin the influence that CEOs have over their boards. By identifying a set of four key influence processes (exploiting key relationships, managing impressions, managing information, and protecting formal authority), the present study uncovers how CEOs influence (and fail to influence) their directors in organizational decision-making. Each of these four processes is both a uniquely important influence mechanism, and part of a broader configuration of interrelated and contextually embedded influence behaviours that together shape the CEOboard relationship and the organization's governance process. While structure and context clearly provide important resources on which CEOs may draw, how CEOs influence their boards is shown to be critically concerned with the ways in which they manage these resources.
This study has important implications for future research on organizational governance. The first is that it is valuable to look beyond the structural bases of power in the study of CEO-board relationships to the influence processes that occur between the two parties. Previous research has highlighted how CEOs' attempts to persuade and ingratiate themselves with directors can shape organizational decision-making (Westphal 1998 ). The present study extends this work by identifying four behavioural mechanisms through which CEOs influence their boards and examining in detail the micro-processes through which this occurs. While this study has focused on the CEO-board relationship in symphony orchestras, we could expect that these dynamics generalize to a variety of medium-sized organizations in both the private and public sectors. Future research could therefore valuably examine the relationships between these four processes and CEO-board influence in a larger and more heterogeneous set of organizations, for example through a survey of CEOs and boards that investigates the micro-activities underpinning the four influence processes identified in the present study.
The second implication of this study concerns future research on board effectiveness. Although the present study did not set out with this particular focus, we can draw on the findings to extend our understanding of the role of CEO influence in board effectiveness. Research on corporate governance suggests that less effective boards may be associated with more powerful CEOs (Daily and Dalton 1994; Kosnik 1987; Pearce and Zahra 1991) ; indeed, some writers argue that a key function of a board is to curtail overly influential executives (Fama and Jensen 1983; Walsh and Seward 1990) . McNulty and Pettigrew (1999; Pettigrew and McNulty 1995) have further found that those boards most actively and widely involved in governance ('maximalist' boards) are those where power is not concentrated in the CEO, but is more widely dispersed. The results of the present study complicate these findings by showing that an influential CEO can be a positive force in organizational governance, and may even increase a board's effectiveness. An important implication for future research, therefore, is the need to look more closely at the relationship between CEO activity, board behaviour, and board effectiveness. Building on research on the collaborative board model of governance (Westphal 1999) , future studies of board effectiveness could usefully examine how influential CEOs may work with, rather than in opposition to, their boards.
The present study also raises important questions about the range of effects that CEOs have by influencing a board. Although CEO-board dynamics in non-profit organizations differ in certain ways from those in their private counterparts (Oster 1995) , it is probably dangerous to assume that, in either type of organization, the influence of one party will necessarily guide decision-making in a direction that is at odds with the goals of the other. The findings of the present study show that CEOs may influence their boards in ways that are in both parties' interests, and may fail to influence them in ways that, had they succeeded, might have been to the benefit of directors and their stakeholders. Future research should acknowledge the multiple goals that exist for key parties in organizational governance and that are very likely to affect the processes and effects of CEO-board influence. 
